

# The Quality of Hungarian Legislation 2013-2014

Budapest, February 2015.

The Corruption Research Center Budapest was created in November 2013 in response to the growing need for independent research on corruption and quality of government in Hungary. Hence, the Center was established as a non-partisan research institute independent of governments, political parties or special interest groups. The aims of the Center are to systematically explore the causes, characteristics, and consequences of low quality of government, corruption, and regulatory failure using an inter-disciplinary approach. The Center also aims to help citizens to hold governments accountable through the use of robust evidence.

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#### The Quality of Hungarian Legislation 2013-2014

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#### Introduction

The CRCB published its first analysis in Hungarian and English last year, which examined the quality of the Hungarian legislation<sup>1</sup>. Our report for 2015 is not a simple repetition and update. Compared to last year's report we extended and deepened our analysis in several areas. We not only analyse the activities of the parliament by statistical methods (i), but also occurrences of public consultations (ii), and the process of drafting a law and of conducting impact assessment (iii).

An important novelty of the report is that by using objective indicators and features, it tries to give a picture of the quality of the preparation of laws and legislation in Hungary. For this we use publicly available data that can be found on the websites of the government and the Hungarian Parliament<sup>2</sup>, and other online sources. Based on the publicly available data we are primarily interested in finding out what happened in 2013-2014 in the areas examined and to what extent the legislative procedure makes it possible for stakeholders to be informed and take part in the process of the preparation of laws (i), to what extent preliminary impact assessments and analyses support the laws made by the Hungarian parliament (ii), and to what extent the approved laws can contribute to legal certainty (iii).

Where it is necessary and possible, we look at previous years as well (as far back as 1990), thereby putting our results into a broader context.

One of the key aspects of the process of drafting and making a law is to find out to what extent the participation of the economic actors is possible, arranged, and predetermined. To what extent is it possible that different interest groups can influence the law and policy making procedure? Is it possible for interest groups to corrupt the lawmaker? Does the lawmaker represent public good or his or her own financial and other interests?

It is also important to examine to what extent the introduction of a bill is based on a carefully considered economic and political strategy, and to what extent they are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See <a href="http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/trvh\_2013\_riport\_140214\_1410.pdf">http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/quality of legislation 2013\_report\_ENG\_141117.pdf</a>
<a href="http://www.parlament.hu/and-http://kormany.hu/">http://kormany.hu/</a>.



supported by empirically well-founded impact assessments. In contrast we also identify and try to measure instances of ad-hoc or improvised lawmaking, likely the result of unsophisticated brainstorming exercises.

Finally, we need to ask how rigorous and profound a debate preceded the passing of the typical law passed by the parliament. After the passage of a law, we track how stable they prove to be – thus contributing to legal certainty – or how often they have to be quickly amended due to previously unconsidered and undesired effects.

From among these questions we examine the process of the preparation of a law by means of statistical analyses, the role of impact assessment in the process, as well as the approval and stability of the laws.

In the first part of the report we collect and analyse data about so-called impact assessment sheets. Next we devote a section to analysing the data relating to pubic consultations. We then turn to the statistical analysis of lawmaking. The most important conclusions of the analysis are summarised at the end of the report.

In the appendix of the report we present the most important and relevant statistical data, the list of public consultations and impact assessment sheets we examined, and an overview of the laws passed in 2013-14.



### 1. Impact Assessments in Hungary 2013-2014

#### 1.1. Rules of Impact Assessments' Procedure

The analysis of impact assessements and their role in legislation process is a new and very important topic in political sciences<sup>3</sup>. The rules and practices of impact assessements have direct and strong effect to the quality of legislation.

In Hungary the impact assessment procedure of legislation are regulated by the 2010 law "On Legislation."<sup>4</sup> They can be split into preliminary and ex-post impact assessments. The preliminary impact assessments are required to analyse the expected outcomes of a proposed law and the consequences if the law were not implemented. An ex-post impact assessment reviews the results and outcomes, both expected and observed, of an existing law. Impact assessments are the responsibility of the ministry or ministries associated with specific laws.

The rules regulating preliminary impact assessments are outlined with more detail in the 2011 "KIM Regulation."<sup>5</sup> According to the law a summary sheet have to be filled about the main expected impacts of the planned regulation regarding competitiveness, administrative burden, social inclusion, fiscal effects, and effects on health and the environment, among others. Positive and negative effects are to be explored and examined, quantitatively if possible. The impact assessment's sheet should be accompanied documentation for all calculations included, along with methodology and other relevant information.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Liannos, I. – Fazekas, M.: Le Patchwork de la pratique des études d'impact en Europe: proposition de taxinomie, Revue francaise d'administration publique no. 149. 2014. p. 29-59.

In Hungarian: jogalkotásról szóló 2010. évi CXXX. Törvény, see: <a href="http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy\_doc.cgi?docid=A1000130.TV">http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy\_doc.cgi?docid=A1000130.TV</a>

http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy\_doc.cgi?docid=A1000130.TV

In Hungarian: 24/2011. (VIII.9.) KIM rendelet, see:

http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy\_doc.cgi?docid=A1100024.KIM



#### 1.2. Empirical Analysis

#### 1.2.1 Preparatory document packages

The documents related to the preparatory phase of a law are available on the government website<sup>6</sup>. Ideally these zipped document packages contain the draft law, the impact assessment(s) and a summary of the electronically submitted opinions from the general public consultation procedure.

We could identify and download 258 document packages in 2011-2014. This is a small number compared to the number of accepted and published laws between 2011 and 2014:  $538^7$ . The situation is probably even worse than this discrepancy indicates, because there is not any indication in the preparatory packages about the future life of the bill, so these numbers can contain also rejected bills. The website of the Parliament does not make it easy to match the preparatory documents and the final, published laws either, as there is not any mutual, unambiguous identification number for these two kinds of documents. We attempted to match the document packages to published laws using the title of the bill, the date of publication and the name of the ministry that submitted the draft. We managed to link 176 document packages (68%) to final laws.

Consequently, the values in Figure 1.2.1.1 should be considered as an optimistic estimate for the portion of laws with a preparatory document package published on the government's website.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Current period: <a href="http://www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?type=302#!DocumentBrowse">http://www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?type=302#!DocumentBrowse</a> Previous periods: <a href="http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/dok?type=302#!DocumentBrowse">http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/dok?type=302#!DocumentBrowse</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> We took into account only bills that were submitted by the government and the ministries, because only in this case is compulsory to prepare impact assessment.



Figure 1.2.1.1: Number of published laws and preparatory document packages, 2011-2014

Note: Grey - number of published laws Orange - number of preparatory document packages

Year	Published laws	Preparatory document packages	%
2011	144	95	66,8
2012	155	73	47,1
2013	156	76	48,7
2014	83	14	16,9
Total	538	258	48,0

Source: calculations by CRCB

The existence of preparatory document packages does not mean automatically that they also include impact assessments. First of all, none of the downloaded packages contained an extensive, detailed study about the predicted impacts of the proposed bill. Instead of this the standard form of impact assessments is the "impact assessment sheet" which is a two page long chart. (See Annex A3. for example)


We identified 280 impact assessment (AI) sheets in the preparatory document packages. These 280 sheets are connected only to 119 bills because there are bills that have more than one impact assessment sheets and there are bills that have none (139 pcs that is 54%). The maximum number of sheets connected to a bill is 24.8

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> This is a draft about the amendment of certain laws regarding healthcare and health insurance ("Az egyes egészségügyi és egészségbiztosítási tárgyú törvények módosításáról")



Figure 1.2.1.2.: Rate of preparatory document packages that contain impact assessment sheet(s), 2011-2014, %



Case numbers: 2011: 95 2012:73 2013:76 2014:14, Total: 258

Source: calculations by CRCB


These sheets are mixed in PDF and Excel format. Because of differences in the format we were able to retrieve information from only 249 files. Hereafter the content of these sheets will be analysed.

#### 1.2.2. Working days spent on impact assessment sheets

The number of working days spent on preparing impact assessment sheets was 2.8 days/sheet on average. This seems extremely short a time for a well-founded, solid analysis. However, it is also possible that ministry officials misunderstood this question in some cases and they indicated only the time they needed actually to fill out the sheet: there are almost 120 sheets that were prepared in only one working days (50%), and 35 sheets (15%) that were prepared in less than one working day according to the data.



Figure 1.2.2.1.: Distribution of IA by number of working days spent on preparing it, 2011-2014



Source: calculations by CRCB



#### 1.2.3 Topics of the impact assessment - Competitiveness

#### Competitiveness in general

Only 42 impact assessment sheets indicate positive or negative impacts on competitiveness in general.

Table 1.2.3.1.: Impact on competitiveness in general, 2011-2014

	pcs	%
Decrease	1	0.4
Does not change	206	83.1
Increase	41	16.5
Total	248	100.0

Source: calculations by CRCB

#### **Employment**

Only 24 of the impact assessment sheets (9.6%) indicate a non-zero impact on employment. When a positive impact is indicated, the exact values for these effects are indicated only in six cases and they are labelled as either "significant" or "it cannot be estimated" in four cases.

#### Administrative burden

The predicted administrative burden of the draft bill in question was analysed in 195 cases (78.6%) according to the sheets. Influenced groups are indicated in significantly fewer cases (see in Table 1.2.3.2). Quantified values are required in the sheets only regarding the competitive sector. Among these we found we found only 8 exact values (5.000, 10.000, 50M, 4.000, 1.8M, 2M, 2M and 100M HUF) without any indication if these values apply for one person or for a group together.



Table 1.2.3.2.: Impact on administrative burden, 2011-2014

	Administrative burden		No answer/Does	
	Increasing	Decreasing	not change	
Competitive sector	14 (6%)	9 (4%)	225 (91%)	
Public administration	47 (19%)	23 (9%)	178 (72%)	
Citizens	12 (5%)	23 (9%)	214 (86%)	

Source: calculations by CRCB

#### 1.2.4 Topics of the impact assessment – Social Inclusion

This topic is totally misunderstood by the experts of the Hungarian Ministries. Instead of disadvantaged groups all influenced groups are discussed in this section, including 'persons under 18', 'anglers', and 'family doctors'. As a consequence this section fails to give information on social inclusion impacts, as usually understood, of the analysed bill. Besides, the effects are indicated only as yes-or-no information. Short written explanations are included in only 55 cases.

Table 1.2.4.1.: Impact on administrative burden, 2011-2014

	Advantage	Disadvantage	No answer	
First group	78 (31%)	21 (8%)	150 (60%)	
Second group	56 (22%)	13 (5%)	180 (72%)	
Third group	35 (14%)	11 (4%)	203 (81%)	
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0				

Source: calculations by CRCB



#### 1.2.5 Topics of the impact assessment – Budget

The budget section is the most frequently completed part of the impact assessment sheets. However, even this means only 63 valid values in 249 forms.

Table 1.2.5.1.: Number of valid values in the budget section 2011-2014

	In the analysed period	Current year	Next 2/4 year
Decreasing effect on the budget balance	57 (23%)	25 (10%)	53 (21%)
Coverage of the balance decreasing effect in the budget	17 (7%)	15 (6%)	16 (6%)
Increasing effect on the budget balance	29 (12%)	15 (6%)	28 (11%)
Taking into consideration the increasing effect on the budget balance	1 (0.4%)	1 (0.4%)	-
Total effect	59 (24%)	23 (9%)	54 (22%)
Total effect compared to the adopted budget	63 (25%)	22 (9%)	58 (23%)

Source: calculations by CRCB

# 1.2.6. Topics of the impact assessment – Sustainable development, Health and Other effects

The impact assessment sheets give information about the presence of these effects (yes or no) and a short written explanation. The explanation section is filled out in generally if there is a significant effect according to the yes-no section. However these explanations say quite little: elementary statistics on the character lengths of these texts are given in the table below.

It is also worthy of note that the rate of sheets mentioning impacts on health is quite high (43%). This is because of the high rate of impact assessment sheets related to bills about health care. It seems that EMMI (Ministry of Human Resources, Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma) submitted bills more often than other ministries. EMMI is mentioned among the submitters in 43% of all sheets in 2011-2014.



Table 1.2.6.1.: Impact on environment, health and other impacts 2011-2014

	Yes	No	Written explanation (if yes)	Length of explanation mean	Length of explanation min	Length of explanation max
Impact on environment	14 (6%)	234 (94%)	10	417	27	1347
Impact on health	107 (43%)	142 (57%)	102	224	41	933
Other impact	36 (15%)	211 (85%)	34	590	87	3209

Note: length is indicated in number of characters


Source: calculations by CRCB

#### 1.2.7 Aggregated results

In order to aggregate the results mentioned above we created an index that shows the ratio of filled-out cells on impact assessment sheets. We consider text cells filled-out if the cell contains relevant text. Specifically we check if cells are empty or if it contains only irrelevant characters (e.g: "-"). We do not take into consideration yes-no questions because they are always filled out. We consider numeric cells filled-out if they contain a non-zero numeric value. The possible maximum number of filled-out cells is 34. As Figure 1.2.4 shows, the average rate of filled-out cells are low (16%). However, this result could be only a starting point of a more advanced analysis. In further research it should be also considered which cells have relevance in connection with the specific draft bill.



Figure 1.2.7.1.: Distribution of the ratio of filled-out cells in impact assessment sheets 2011-2014



To sum it up, the most important – indirect - problems with impact assessments are that they are missing, presumed absent, for a significant number of accepted and published laws and when they exist, they are only short sheets with limited content.

The impact assessment sheets themselves are of varying quality with little exact, factual data. The overall impression is that these sheets have a mainly formal role in the procedure of legislation.



#### 2. Public Consultation 2011-2014

#### 2.1. Rules of Public Consultation in Hungary

The current public consultation process in Hungary is regulated by the 2010 "Law on the participation of the community in the preparation of laws" (2010 / CXXX Law). <sup>9</sup> According to this law, draft laws must be made available to the public and put to debate and discussion with the broader community, with the exception of specific laws like the annual budget or legislation deemed urgent. The consultation types can be either "general," meaning that anyone can contribute opinions or thoughts on the government's website, or "direct," meaning that only specific interest groups, presumably to be affected by the law under consideration, will be invited to contribute their opinions. "General" consultations are to be held whenever there is a public consultation process. Our research is focused on the public consultations found on the government's website. From them we get a broad view of how these consultations work, and note the characteristics of debates of laws that are eventually passed and the successes and failures of this system.

The next phase of a consultation involves the response of the government minister responsible for the preparation of the specific piece of legislation. The minister is required to summarize the feedback given by citizens, providing reasons for why specific suggestions are not carried out, and to post this analysis on the government website alongside a list of reviewers.

According to the Office of National Economic Planning ("Nemzetgazdasági Tervezési Hivatal") the following rules and regulations, among others, must be followed in a general public consultation:<sup>10</sup>

- The consultation must be carried out at such point in the lawmaking process that it may influence the opinions of lawmakers.
- The planned legislative timeframe must leave room for the public to formulate useful opinions and suggestions. Experience shows that the more time is allowed, the better the feedback. (However, a legal minimum is not defined.)
- The documentation released in conjunction with a public consultation should be easily understandable, concise and jargon-free.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> In Hungarian: "2010. évi CXXX. törvény a jogszabályok előkészítésében való társadalmi részvételről." See: <a href="http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy\_doc.cgi?docid=A1000131.TV">https://www.nth.gov.hu/hu/media/download/206</a>



The framework must help the people quickly recognize and decide whether a
specific consultation and the associated published documentation are relevant
to their lives. To this end, the creation of a public information table
summarizing the different consultations is necessary.

#### 2.2. Empirical analysis

The official procedure of general public consultation consists of the solicitation of public input via email after a preparatory document package appears on the government's website. The deadline for this action is indicated on the page. These deadlines are often very tight. The average number of days a consultation was open varied between 4 and 8 days in 2011-2014. In the case of five bills the deadline for giving opinions was the same day as the day the bill appeared on the website. This practice is actually not against the law as there is no legal minimum defined for the period of submitting opinions but it definitely limits the possibility to draw up and submit opinions.



Figure 2.2.1.: Distribution of consultation procedures according to the number of days between date of opening the public consultation and deadline for submitting views 2011-2014




Table 2.2.1.: Main statistics of public consultations' deadlines (the number of days between date of package and deadline for submitting views) 2011-2014

		Number of preparatory packages	Mean	Median (days)	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
-	2011	65	7,66	6,00	6,05	0	35
	2012	66	6,94	5,50	6,77	1	43
	2013	74	7,19	6,00	5,52	0	31
	2014	13	4,38	5,00	2,96	0	12
	Total	218	7,09	6,00	5,98	0	43


Source: calculations by CRCB

Note: 2 negative values excluded from data and in 38 cases no deadline was given on the site

If opinions arrived to a specific bill, the content of the suggestions and the ministries' reaction to them is published in a summary. Probably partly because of the tight deadlines and the passive way the ministries solicit feedback, the number of these summaries is very low. Only 22 document packages include a summary of the public consultation for a total of 8.5% of all packages.



Figure 2.2.1.: Rate of packages that contain summary of the public consultation, 2011-2014, %



Case numbers: 2011: 95, 2012:73, 2013:76, 2014:14, Total: 258

Source: calculations by CRCB



## 3. Analysis of Hungarian Legislation 2006-2014

#### 3.1. Change in the Rules of Legislation - 2014

#### The new Standing Order

On February 13 2014 the Hungarian Parliament accepted the parliamentary resolution (10/2014 (II.24.) National Assembly resolution)<sup>11</sup> that, after 10 years of the previous system, essentially formulates/frames a fundamentally new Standing Order<sup>12</sup>:

The new Standing Order was originally set to come into effect only after the following election, in May 2014 ("this resolution shall come into effect after the next general election of the MPs, on the day of the inaugural session of the National Assembly"). However, in May 2014 <sup>13</sup>this very new Standing Order was immediately changed <sup>14</sup> by the FIDESZ majority. The final version (10/2014. (II.24.) OGY) can be read here <sup>15</sup>.

There was no doubt about the need for a new Standing Order. Of course, there were parts which were immediately criticized by both the opposition and the press. One example is the Order on standing up to greet the Speaker of the House. Later the Order was modified stating that MPs should stand up to greet 'voters' at the beginning of the session. The new rule generated spirited discussions about the ban on using aids during speeches — aids, interpreted as 'tangible, visual or sound recordings as means of illustration, " are prohibited by the new regulation. The new house rule eventually included this clause, which means that Hungarian legislation

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1&p\_p\_col\_count=1&\_pairproxy\_WAR\_pairproxyportlet\_INSTANCE\_9xd2Wc9jP4z8\_pairAction=%2Finternet%2Fcplsql%2Fogy\_irom.irom\_adat%3Fp\_ckl%3D40%26p\_izon%3D132

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14 http://www.parlament.hu/irom40/00132/00132.pdf

<sup>11</sup> http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/13253/13253.pdf

http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o14h0010.htm/o14h0010.htm



forbade the use of figures and tables as visual aids during speeches or statements in Parliament.

Only those parts of the new Standing Order will be studied that are important in terms of legislative procedure. Chapter VI. in the resolution of the Parliament regulates the general rules for the debates of bills.

According to the new Standing Order if the President of the Republic, the government or a standing committee of the National Assembly submits a bill, then it will be entered in the Order Book automatically.

Concerning proposals by MPs (of which there are many examples), other rules apply. As a rule, the designated committee decides on the Order Book:

"Proposed legislation submitted by a Member of the National Assembly will be entered in the Order Book of the National Assembly if it is supported by a standing committee (hereafter Order Book committee) designated by the Speaker of Parliament."

With this rule, in almost all cases, the plenary sittings are not obliged to debate unwanted proposals submitted by the opposition. This limits the opposition's opportunities to a great extent.

The most crucial change affects the further expansion of the scope of authority for a committee. In depth debate, which was previously conducted during plenary sittings according to the old Standing Order, will be led by the designated standing committee (*Order Book committee*) as stated in the new the Standing Order:

"After a legislative proposal is submitted the Speaker of Parliament designates a standing committee (Order Book committee) (hereafter designated committee) to conduct a detailed debate."

Any other designated committee, however, can announce that they wish to have a detailed debate about provisions fitting into their scope of responsibilities. They are referred to as "committees related to debates" by the NA resolution.

As a rule, there should be at least seven days between the submission and the start of the general debate of a legislative proposal. As can be seen in case of specific procedures, there can be significant deviation from the above mentioned rule.



The House Committee can set up a time frame for general discussions on legislative proposals. These rules are precisely set by the Standing Order. The new Standing Order provides a minimal number of hours for amending the Fundamental Law, for initiating a lack of confidence in the Prime Minister, for budget issues, or legislative proposals on its implementations.

The committee on legislation is a new institution, which acts as a "super committee". As a rule, a proposal to an amendment/motion to a bill can be submitted by MPs, the negotiating committee and the Committee on legislation. The special and privileged rights of the Committee on legislation are many.

It can put forth a motion following proposals and reports made by the negotiating committees. The committee on its own, or on request by the proposer or if the two are not the same, then by the government, can overwrite the motions and decisions made by designated or related committees.

As mentioned earlier, a detailed discussion of the bills is conducted by the negotiating committee. However, the negotiating committee is not only to negotiate the proposed amendments, but also, surprisingly enough, it is responsible for deciding issues to be studied before the commencement of the general debate:

"During a detailed debate the designated committee examines that the bill

- a) meets the content and form requirements set by the Fundamental Law
- b) fits in the unity of the legal system,
- c) complies with the obligations of the international law and the European Union law
- d) meets the professional requirements of the legislation. "

At the end of the detailed debate, the accepted amendments are compiled into one proposal, and it is submitted by the negotiating committee (the so-called committee motion closing the detailed debate). If there are multiple negotiating committees, then each committee submits its own committee motion closing the detailed debate separately. These and the corresponding committee reports on the detailed debates, assuming the supercommittee does not override, are discussed by the Plenary sitting, and the representatives vote on the motions.

The new Standing Order precisely regulates this procedure and also determines timeframes:



"If the Committee on legislation submits a summary report, the debate is started by the speaker designated by the committee on legislation, and then - if there is a minority opinion within the committee on legislation – they are followed by the speaker of the minority opinion. These speeches are to be delivered in a total of fifteen minutes, and if there is a minority opinion then seven minutes should be given to express that."

#### Special forms of negotiation

#### 1. Urgent debate

Urgent debate can be initiated by the proposer and 25 supporting representatives. With this procedure the time between the submission of the bill and the start of the general debate can be reduced to two days, and all other deadlines are radically shortened as well. What is more, the Standing Order also stipulates that there must be at least six days between the submission and the final vote. Committees may meet during the plenary sitting.

An important rule is that, according to the resolution of the Parliament "there may be six urgent debates in half a year" and "requires a 2/3 decision."

#### 2 Specific procedures

Such a procedure can be initiated by the proposer or at least one-fifth of the representatives. There may be maximum four specific procedures per half a year. The Fidesz majority, however, used this opportunity four times in the first half of 2014, in May and in June.

On the specific procedure type of debate, the Hungarian Parliament shall decide without debate. In order to have a specific procedure more than half of the MPs' votes are required. The vote will decide on deadlines differing from the general rule.

In specific procedures, the detailed debate of the bill is conducted by the Committee on legislation with the application of NA resolution § 44 Sec. (1) and (3) (4).

3. Departing from the provisions of the Standing Order/Rules of Procedure
The Standing Order allows:



"As an exception, without any debate the National Assembly may decide on the ground of the proposal by the House Committee that with the vote of fourfifths of the Members it is permitted to depart from the Rules of Procedure in case of an issue debate or decision making."

So the Standing Order contains a provision with which a departure from the Orders is made possible. However, nothing more can be known about this procedure. There were six use cases of this provision in May and June in 2014, and two between July and December 2014. Clearly they wanted to be able to keep to the quota for the urgent and specific procedures.

#### Presumptive advantages and disadvantages

Those in favour of the new Standing Order argue that committees are able to deal with bills and amendment proposals more efficiently. Detailed discussions during plenary sittings did not generate any interest, thus those were mere waste of time <sup>16</sup>. Improvements in the quality of the laws are expected, because the supercommittee (the Committee on legislation) can spot any incoherent proposals, and at the same time they can compile a version of the different proposals, which will be in harmony with itself and with all other legislation/laws. The restriction of amendment opportunities before voting is highlighted as a great achievement. They claim that this way there will be fewer chances for having 'omnibus bills,' that is, laws covering a number of diverse or unrelated topics, and amending more laws at the same time. Some of the most government-critical blogs and weekly magazines also mention these advantages<sup>17</sup>.

Those against the new Standing Order argue that there is still an opportunity for specific procedures, that is in two days a new law can be born, or an old one amended, thus making no room for anyone to respond to the new regulation. With this option the parliamentary majority, except for the MPs and the opposition, sets the footing for those concerned, including professional organizations, market actors,

A Kövér László (FIDESZ) szándéka szerint szakítanának az "üres, unalmas, néha személyeskedő szócsépléssel", lásd: <a href="http://hvg.hu/itthon/20131114\_Orszaggyules\_hazszabaly\_Kover\_Laszlo">http://http



indeed the whole society. The following is the statement made by one of the smaller opposition party's leader:

"According to Schiffer there are several parts of the proposal which may influence the legislature. One hour before the meeting it is still possible to submit proposal to amend the daily Order Book, they would start a specific procedure instead of an urgent procedure, thus making it possible to depart from the usual legislative process. In connection with this the faction leader claimed that the simple majority could make it accepted that four times in half a year the legislative procedure could be put between 'inverted commas/put on hold'.

The politician emphasized that although the rules concerning the submission of motions before final vote would be stricter; still there are chances to submit these motions 72 hours before the commencement of meetings/sittings in certain cases. Furthermore he underlined that this process excludes the public and professional control, and according to Schiffer in the past years this was the favourite 'channel' for lobby groups."<sup>18</sup>

Critics of the new Standing Order also question whether the committees are sufficiently prepared to perform new tasks. They also mention the problem of limited publicity, since the debates are conducted by the committees. Although the sessions are open, but there is little chance for live broadcast, or for having the minutes made public or accessible in one or two days. As we will see these concerns are likely to be completely legitimate. The socialists criticized the following aspect: "According to the socialist György Bárándy the Standing Order proposal is an admission by the governmental parties that the operation of the House is unacceptable. He said that one of the major changes with the setting up of the Committee on legislation is that the scene of the detailed debate will be the Committee itself. He would regard it as a viable option if as in cases of the plenary sitting it would also get publicity (radio and TV recordings). He said that with the two-minute—limited speeches the debate gets killed."

#### The effects on the quality of legislation

From the above description, we cannot assess whether the effectiveness of the legislature has increased, but it is clear that with the new Standing Order the time requirements for passing bills have reduced.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>András Schiffer is deputy of an opposition party (LMP). http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20131208\_nem\_tetszik\_az\_lmp\_nek\_a\_keszulo\_uj\_hazszabaly



Has the transparency of the legislation increased or decreased? There are still verbatim minutes about plenary sittings. According to the Standing Order Minutes are to be made at Committee meetings, as well.

If someone is interested in the latter, a significant decrease in the accessibility can be perceived. It is very complicated to find minutes on the website of the National Assembly. After thorough research on the Committees' separate pages we were able to find tables about the time of Committee Meetings, where on clicking on a coloured number we got access to the minutes of the given meeting. From this we can learn what were on the agenda that day, and a summary of who said what is also available. Unfortunately, the time spent on debating the bill is not known. It can only be determined in exceptional cases because, although we know the duration of the meeting, the time spent on each item of the agenda cannot be calculated and cannot be found.

Therefore it is impossible to state how much time the designated and related Committees, and the Committee on legislation rendered on dealing with the given law. It is also not possible to determine how much time is spent on placing motions/proposals in the Order Book, on hearings, on briefings and how much time is left for the real work: the draft legislation. To provide an example, we took notes on the activities of the Committee on Legislation and the Committee on Economic Affairs in May in 2014 and between the period of June and the end of December in 2014.

E.g.: the minutes of the Economic Committee on 9. December 2014 can be found here: <a href="http://www.parlament.hu/documents/static/biz40/bizjkv40/GAB/1412091.pdf">http://www.parlament.hu/documents/static/biz40/bizjkv40/GAB/1412091.pdf</a>



Table 3.1.1.: Time spent on meetings at the Committee on Economic Affairs

Date	Agenda items	Length of meeting in
		hours and minutes
June 03.	hearings	1h49'
June 10.	Entering items in the Order Book	08'
June18.	One bill debate+SAO request	12'
June 25.	Several bill debates	19'
June 30.j	Entering items in the Order Book	11'
September17	Several bills and Entering items in the Order Book	47'
September 20.	hearings	2h35'
September 25.	Several bills and Entering items in the Order Book and others	38'
October 13.	Several bills and Entering items in the Order Book and others	25'
October 20.	Entering items in the Order Book	14'
October 21.	Several bills and SAO report	59'
October 28.	Several bills	05'
November 05.	Several bills.+SAO+others	38'
November 10.	bill debate and Entering items in the Order Book and others	10'
November 12.	Briefing, bill debate, others	1h36'
November 18.	bills debate and Entering items in the Order Book	26'
November 24.	resolutions	08'
November 27.	3 bills debate	42'
December 02.	Bills debate and resolutions	26'
December 09.	Hearings, bills debate, others	1h32

Note: Time spent on meetings is approx. 14 hours in total according to the table Source: calculations by CRCB



Table 3.1.2.: Time spent on meetings at the Committee on Legislation: 12. 2014 – December 12. 2014

date	Agenda items	Length of meeting in
	_	hours and minutes
May 12.	Forming and several bills	3h10'
May 15.	One bill.:T/106	0h13'
May 28.	Several bills	No data available
June 05.	One bill.:T/146	1h55'
June 10.	One bill.:T/154	0h43'
June 19.	One bill.:T/168	0h37'
June 23.	One bill.:T/357	0h11'
June26.	Debate of several bills	1h38'
June30.	One bill.:T/311	1h13'
July 02.	Debate of several bills	1h31'
September 18.	Debate of several bills	1h33'
September 22.	One bill.:T/1272	1h19'
September 24.	One bill.:T/466	0h22'
October 16.	One bill.:T/1124	0h06'
October 20.	One bill.:T/1273	0h03'
October 30.	Debate of several bills	0h41'
November 06.	Debate of several bills	0h43'
November 12.	Debate of several bills	1h16'
November 13.	Debate of several bills	0h59'
November 20.	Debate of several bills	2h27'
November 27.	Debate of several bills	1h10'
December 04.	Debate of several bills	4h04'
December 11.	Debate of several bills	5h19
December 12.	Debate of several bills	1h52'
December 15.	The Minutes cannot be read electronically.	
December 23.	The Minutes cannot be read electronically.	

Note: Time spent on meetings is approx. 33 hours 12 minutes in total according to the table Source: calculations by CRCB

That is the Committee on Economic Affairs in five parliamentary months held meetings, on average, in 2 hours and 28 minutes monthly, 32-33 minutes weekly.

The monthly average of the super committee is a little bit more than 5.5 hours; the weekly average is a little bit less than 1.5 hours. It means that the super committee that had the most and longest meetings and debated most of the bills worked 1.5 hours a week. We can claim that the new Standing Order created the opportunity to a radically accelerated legislation procedure, and it has been implemented. As a consequence the transparency of legislation has been reduced.



#### Committee Minutes in other EU member states

In the United Kingdom the minutes of Committee debates are available and they are assigned to specific laws so it can be calculated how much time was spent with a certain bill. E.g the reports of the committee sessions of the Childcare Payments Act 2014 bill are available here:

http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/childcarepayments/stages.html

And the minutes of the first sitting of the Committee is available here:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/childcare/141014/am/141014s01.htm

In Germany the summaries about the recommendations of Committees are available but no exact minutes. In France only preparatory documents of Committees are public but exact minutes are not.

#### 3.2. Quantitative indicators of the quality of lawing making

#### Number of laws

In this section we describe some indicators regarding the characteristics of legislation. The quantity of new bills and laws per year has a significant effect on their quality because it determines the time available for preparation, development of impact assessments and for public consultation. Figure 3.2.1. shows that between 2011 and 2013 a comparatively high number of bills were passed and published by the Hungarian Parliament reaching a peak in 2012. However in 2014 this number was dropped. It is noteworthy the number of published laws between 2011 and 2013 is nearly the quarter of the number of published laws in the previous 21 years. In election years usually less law is published.



1,25 133 54 <u>58</u> 

Figure 3.2.1.: Number of published laws per year and government 1990-2014

Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1.

Election years: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014. Election year

Source: calculations by CRCB

It is relatively hard to draw clear-cut conclusions regarding the quality of legislation of the Hungarian governments from Figure 3.2.1. as the underlying length of legislative periods varied per prime minister. In order to make comparisons clearer Figure 3.2.2 shows the monthly average of published laws in each government cycle. It is clearly notable that in the era of the second Orban-government, elected in 2010, the average number of newly published laws per month increased significantly. Although in the first eight months of the third Orban-government this average became lower.



17.3 18 15,0 16 14,2 14 12,1 11,4 10,7 10.4 12 9.8 8,6 10 8 6 4 Antall J. - Boross Gyurcsány F. (1) Gyurcsány F. (2) Orbán V. (3) Orbán V. (1) Orbán V. (2) Horn Gy Medgyessy P. Bajnai

Figure 3.2.2.: Number of published laws under each government, monthly average 1990-2014

Note: In the last examined period (OV (3)) only 8 months were analysed (May 2014- Dec 2014). Source: calculations by CRCB

#### The length of preparation and debate


The growing number of new laws passed has caused the time available for preparation, debate and decision-making to decrease in the period of the second Orban-government. The average number of days between the introduction of a bill and the publication of the final law in the official journal was between 31 and 48 during the years of the second Orban-government (2010-2014) – in 2010, it was only 31 which is the lowest value during the analysed period (2006-2014). The second lowest value was reached in 2013 with 41 days. In the first eight month of the Orban government elected in 2014 the average number was 54 days, what is the second lowest value in comparison to the former governments.

The decrease of the days between the introduction and the final act in the Orban-era since 2010 is more conspicuous if we are looking at the median instead of the average – so when we are looking at the "value in the middle", compared to which half of the laws were published faster and half of them slower. The few laws with extremely short or long legislative process less affect this value. The lowest value was reached in 2014, before the election with 15.5 days, however there was clear breakpoint at the change of government in 2010: in the former period the medians



were between 39 and 55, but afterwards these values were varying between 15.5 and 37.

Figure 3.2.3.: Average number of days between introduction and publication of a bill, 1998-2014



n=52, 81, 184, 114, 163, 41, 150, 212, 225, 212, 16, 97

Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1.

Source: calculations by CRCB

Figure 3.2.4.: Median number of days between introduction and publication of a bill, 1998-2014



Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1.

Source: calculations by CRCB



#### Bills submitted by Member of Parliament

There is an important difference between bills submitted by Members of Parliament (MPs) and those submitted by ministries or committees of the government. In the case of MPs' bills, certain phases of the decision making process can be skipped. These phases are, for example, ministerial and public consultations, which are normally part of the standard procedure of law making. What is cause for concern regarding MPs' bills is that it is not clear who, which organisations and whose interests had an influence on the bill<sup>20</sup>. This process is markedly less transparent than the alternative.

While governing through bills submitted by MPs could be faster, the public consultations and professional debates are more limited and it increases the risk that important interests and professional considerations will not have an influence on the final decision. This could result in passing inadequate, erroneous regulation – sometimes maybe just because of incomplete information. In general terms, the increasing rate of MPs' bills could increase also the risk of government failure.<sup>21</sup>

Figure 3.2.5 shows that since 2010 a higher number of bills submitted by MPs have been passed compared to the former government period<sup>22</sup> that also translates into a considerably higher proportion of these laws under the second Orbán government compared to the previous governments.<sup>23</sup>

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Tóth, István János – Cserpes, Tünde – Kotek, Péter – Vereckei, András: Kormányzati kudarcok, járadékvadászat és korrupciós kockázatok a magyar villamosenergia-szektorban, in: Szántó, Zoltán – Tóth, István János – Varga, Szabolcs (ed.): A (Kenő)pénz nem boldogít? Gazdaságszociológiai és politikai gazdaságtani elemzések a magyarországi korrupcióról, BCE Szociológia és Társadalompolitika Intézet Korrupciókutató-központ, Budapest, 2012. március. pp. 99-239. <a href="http://www.crc.uni-corvinus.hu/download/szz">http://www.crc.uni-corvinus.hu/download/szz</a> tij vsz a kenopenz 120330.pdf

About the reasons of government failures see: Besley, T. 2006: Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford University Press, New York.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The data analysed in the following sections are available for us only for 2006-2014, so the analysis is limited to this period and thereinafter "2006/2" implies the period after the election in 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> 2010/1 is excluded from this comparison due to the low number of laws passed, only 39.



100% 90% 80% 70% 68% 68% 69% 74% 72% 76% 60% 81% 84% 84% 85% 89% 50% 40% 30% **50%** 20% 28% 29% 10% 0% 2006/1 2006/2 2007 2008 2009 2010/12010/2 2011 2012 2013 2014/12014/2 ■ Committee MP ■ Government (Ministries)

Figure 3.2.5.: The ratio of published laws by type of submitter per year, 2006-2014

n=52, 81, 184, 114, 163, 41, 150, 212, 225, 212, 16, 97

Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1. Source: calculations by CRCB

The share of bills submitted by deputies of the ruling parties also reached a peak in 2010, until the first year of the second Orban-government. A probable cause of this is that in the first months after the change of government the bureaucracy was not altered. In 2011 there was a sharp decline regarding this rate, however it remained high comparing to the period before 2010.



60.0% 49,3% 50,0% 40,0% 27,8% 29,3% 26,8% 30,0% 24,7% 24.5% 20,9% 18,8% 20,0% 7,7% 8,6% 7.6% 10,0% 0,0% 2008 2009 2007 2011

Figure 3.2.6.: Share of bills submitted by MPs of ruling parties, 2006-2014, %

n=52, 81, 184, 114, 163, 41, 150, 212, 225, 212, 16, 97

Source: calculations by CRCB

Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1.

#### The share of "junk laws"

A passed and published law can be modified if needed. Modifications could become necessary, on the one hand, because of the pressure from economic and social changes typical of turbulent times such as the financial crisis of 2009-2010. But on the other hand, poor preparation could also result in quick amendments when the shortcomings and negative effects of the law emerge after it comes into force. So quick amendments of laws may refer to their low – "junky" – quality.

To ensure comparability, Figure 3.2.6. shows the rate of laws that needed to be modified within one year after their publication in the official journal. In this way the results aren't influenced by the fact that earlier laws are more probable to have been amended simply because of the longer time passed since they were published. It is clearly visible that the number of laws modified within one year was extraordinarily high in 2011 and 2012. This applies also for the rate of these modified laws (Figure 3.2.7.).



2006/2 2010/1 2010/2 

Figure 3.2.7.: Number of laws modified within one year, 2006-2013

Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1.

Source: calculations by CRCB




Figure 3.2.8.: Rate of laws modified within one year compared to all published laws, 2006-2013,  $^{\circ}\!\!\!\!/$ 

Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1.

Source: calculations by CRCB



#### Improvised law making

In addition we should note that the share of the amending acts in the total number of bills seems to show some improvement since the second Orban-government came to power – this implies that the number of the amending acts became higher in the period between 2010 and 2014 than it was before because of the growing number of published laws. We should note that there was a break in the last months of the second Orban-government in 2014 that was probably influenced by the elections.




Figure 3.2.9.: Share of amending acts in total bills, 2006-2014, %

n=52, 81, 184, 114, 163, 41, 150, 212, 225, 212, 16, 97

Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1. Source: calculations by CRCB

The amending acts can modify several laws at the same time, so the number of amendments included in these bills can better characterize the intensity of altering the legal environment. The number of amending acts modifying several<sup>24</sup> laws published within one year<sup>25</sup> reached a peak in 2012. In the last two years this number declined, however considering such amendments regarding laws published within two years the decline between 2012 and 2013 was much slighter. It should be


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> At least two.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> This restriction is needed because the data available only since 2006. The analysis considers the amending acts that change several laws which were published maximum 365 days (or 730 in the case of the longer period) before the given amending act was published.



highlighted that Figure 3.2.10. is based only on the amending acts, not on all the published laws like the previous figures.

Figure 3.2.10.: Number of amending acts modifying several laws, 2007-2014



■ Modifying laws published within one year ■ Modifying laws published within two years

Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Annex 1.

Source: calculations by CRCB



#### 5. Conclusions

#### 5.1. General observations

- 1. The years of 2011-13 were very turbulent period from the point of view of Hungarian legislation. The Hungarian Parliament adopted between 212 and 226 laws per year. In contrast, between 1990 and 2009 this average was only 125.
- 2. We can characterize this period by the following properties:
- 2.1. The formality of public consultation was present during entire period. However, citizens and stake-holders had chance to formulate their opinion and to effectively review bills only in a minority of cases.
- 2.2. The lack of impact assessment studies was endemic. The lack of deep and empirically grounded analyses of potential economic and social effects of a bill characterised almost every case. Additionally, even the elaborated studies suffer from an acute lack of transparency. The impact assessment procedure established by the Hungarian Government (i.e. impact assessment sheets) was entirely ineffective and amounts to a formality.
- 2.3. We can observe an increasing trend in the volume of bills submitted by the deputies of ruling parties. There was high ratio of bills which avoided professional consultations by relevant ministries.
- 2.4. The data analysis shows that less time is spent on the preparation of bills and on the debate of these bills in the general assembly.
- 2.5. The data shows a rising share of "junk laws", i. e. the published laws with considerable faults, which needed to be modified within one year of their publication.



- 3. The resulting framework has the following negative consequences in the medium and long term.
- 3.1. These effects cause deterioration of legal certainty and erosion of the rule of law.
- 3.2. The standard procedures and rules now governing the creation and modification of Hungarian legislation imply arising level of corruption risks in the body of law.
- 3.3. The effects analysed below imply low and weakening broad-based social influence in the entire legislative procedure.

#### 5.2. Specific observations

- 4. Our analysis aimed at gauging the quality of the preparatory process of bills submitted in Hungary in 2011-2014. We analysed 258 preparatory document packages related to draft bills, from which we retrieved the information content of 248 impact assessment sheets and 27 summaries of public consultations.
- 5. The preparatory packages are not directly linked to the final, accepted law they are related to, but based on the number of published laws and the number of preparatory packages, a maximum 48% of laws submitted my ministries may have publicly available preparatory packages in 2011-2014.
- 6. There are not any detailed, well-founded, data-based impact assessment studies in the preparatory document packages, only formal impact assessment sheets for the most part.
- 7. The number of working days spent on preparing the impact assessment sheets is 2.8 days on average in 2011-2014, which is low by any reasonable standard: this period is not enough to work out detailed, well-founded analyses.
- 8. The sheets are poor in factual, exact data. Only the budget section includes exact values.
- 9. The deadlines for sending in opinions in the public consultations were tight, ranging from 4-8 days on average in 2011-2014, in five cases the deadline and the date of the preparatory package were the same.



- 10. There are very few summaries of opinions on the government's website: only 22 document packages include a summary. The tight deadlines may be partly responsible for this.
- 11. Regarding the quality of legislation, the aim of the empirical analysis was to highlight some characteristics of the laws published in Hungary focusing on the last two years. The analysis is based on the data available on the webpage of the Hungarian National Assembly and the Office of the Hungarian National Assembly. Our dataset is referring to the period between 2006 and 2014 containing 1547 published laws.
- 12. The years between 2011 and 2013 were very turbulent within 2006-2014. The average number of published laws in these years was 217. In contrast, between 1990 and 2009 this average was only 125.
- 13. In the eras of Orbán-governments the share of bills submitted by deputies of the ruling parties are extremely high. In the first months of 2010, after the change of government, probably the bureaucracy was not altered, and the new government did not trust in its middle and top management. However this ratio did not decline to its level before the second Orban-government, as it was moving between 19% and 29% since 2011. The consequences may be the following:
  - less professionally elaborated bills,
  - non-transparent preparation of bills, with disordered influences,
  - greater possibility of positive or negative discrimination of business groups,
  - rising risk of corruption in connection with legislation and of regulatory capture.
- 14. The number and share of published laws modified within one year became extraordinarily high in 2011. Though this number decreased annually to 2013, it remains high in historical terms. The number of amending acts modifying several laws published within the last two years also became excessively high in 2012 and 2013. A marked decrease in 2014 can likely be explained by the elections. These factors may have led to the deterioration of the legal certainty and rising uncertainty



among economic actors, particularly in 2011 and 2012, when the "junk legislation" was mostly typical. These effects may last for a long time, distorting legal certainty far into the future.

15. Legislation became faster. The time elapsed between the introduction and the publication of a bill significantly shortened after 2010. The accelerated legislative process led to restricted possibilities to debate, and to form and explain professional arguments. These effects can be seen in the growing share of "junk" or faulty laws – and also in the rising number of laws published in 2011 and 2012 and their subsequent modifications. The pace of legislation further quickened because of the changes to the rules of legislation in 2014. This compounding phenomenon may lead to faster legislation on the one hand and limited debates – and even reduced publicity of the debates – on the other.



# Annex

## A1. Prime Ministers in Hungary, 1990-2012

Start date	End date	Prime minister	Party
May 23. 1990	Dec 12. 1993	Antall, József	MDF
Dec 12. 1993	Jul 15. 1994	Boross, Péter	MDF
Jul 15. 1994	Jul 6. 1998	Horn, Gyula	MSZP
Jul 6. 1998	May 27. 2002	Orbán, Viktor	Fidesz
May 27. 2002	Sept 29. 2004	Medgyessy, Péter	MSZP
Sept 29. 2004	Jun 9. 2006	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	MSZP
Jun 9. 2006	Apr 14. 2009	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	MSZP
Apr 14. 2009	May 29. 2010	Bajnai, Gordon	MSZP
May 29. 2010	June 6 2014	Orbán, Viktor	Fidesz
June 6 2014		Orbán, Viktor	Fidesz

Notation: : general elections



## A2. Analysis of Legislation 2006-2014

Table A2.1.: Number of published laws per year and government 1990-2014

Year	Prime Minister	Number of published laws
1990	Antall, József	77
1991	Antall, József	93
1992	Antall, József	89
1993	Antall, József – Boross, Péter	116
1994	Boross, Péter	55
1994	Horn, Gyula	50
1995	Horn, Gyula	125
1996	Horn, Gyula	131
1997	Horn, Gyula	159
1998	Horn, Gyula	35
1998	Orbán, Viktor	58
1999	Orbán, Viktor	125
2000	Orbán, Viktor	145
2001	Orbán, Viktor	121
2002	Orbán, Viktor	10
2002	Medgyessy, Péter	58
2003	Medgyessy, Péter	133
2004	Medgyessy, Péter	86
2004	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	54
2005	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	189
2006	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	57
2006	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	78
2007	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	184
2008	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	114
2009	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	22
2009	Bajnai, Gordon	141
2010	Bajnai, Gordon	44
2010	Orbán, Viktor	146
2011	Orbán, Viktor	213
2012	Orbán, Viktor	226
2013	Orbán, Viktor	212
2014	Orbán, Viktor	16
2014	Orbán, Viktor	97
	1.4. 1. 00.00	

Source: calculations by CRCB

Notation: : general elections



Table A2.2.: Number of published laws under each government, monthly average 1990-2014

Prime Minister	Monthly average of published laws
Antall J Boross P.	8,6
Horn Gy.	10,4
Orbán V. (1)	9,8
Medgyessy P.	10,7
Gyurcsány F. (1)	15,0
Gyurcsány F. (2)	11,4
Bajnai G.	14,2
Orbán V. (2)	17,3
Orbán V. (3)	12,1

Source: calculations by CRCB

Table A2.3.: Average number of days elapsed between introduction and publication of a bill, 2006-2014

Year	Average number of days between introduction and publication of a bill
2006/1	52,9
2006/2	42,0
2007	54,1
2008	66,0
2009	87,5
2010/1	70,6
2010/2	30,9
2011	41,8
2012	46,3
2013	40,8
2014/1	48,0
2014/2	54,1

Source: calculations by CRCB



Table A2.4.: Median number of days elapsed between introduction and publication of a bill, 2006-2014

Year / government	Median number of days between introduction and publication of a bill		
2006/1	41,5		
2006/2	39,0		
2007	49,0		
2008	48,0		
2009	59,0		
2010/1	55,0		
2010/2	28,5		
2011	35,5		
2012	34,0		
2013	35,0		
2014/1	15,5		
2014/2	37,0		

Source: calculations by CRCB

Table A2.5.: The ratio of published laws by type of submitter per year, 2006-2014

Year	Ŋ	ИΡ	Con	Committee		Government (Ministries)	
. oa.	N	%	N	%	N	%	
2006/1	4	8%	2	4%	46	89%	
2006/2	9	11%	4	5%	68	84%	
2007	19	10%	9	5%	156	85%	
2008	14	12%	4	4%	96	84%	
2009	36	22%	4	3%	123	76%	
2010/1	11	27%	2	5%	28	68%	
2010/2	75	50%	5	3%	70	47%	
2011	59	28%	9	4%	144	68%	
2012	66	29%	4	2%	155	69%	
2013	54	26%	2	1%	156	74%	
2014/1	3	19%	0		13	81%	
2014/2	24	25%	3	3%	70	72%	

Source: calculations by CRCB



Table A2.6.: Share of bills submitted by deputies of ruling parties, 2006-2014, %

Year	Share of bills submitted by deputies of ruling parties (%)	
2006/1	7,7%	
2006/2	8,6%	
2007	7,6%	
2008	10,5%	
2009	20,9%	
2010/1	26,8%	
2010/2	49,3%	
2011	27,8%	
2012	29,3%	
2013	24,5%	
2014/1	18,8%	
2014/2	24,7%	

Source: calculations by CRCB

Table A2.7.: Number of laws modified within one year, 2006-2013

Year	Number of laws modified within one year
2006/2	8
2007	8
2008	9
2009	15
2010/1	7
2010/2	17
2011	56
2012	49
2013	27

Source: calculations by CRCB



# A3. One example of impact assessment sheet

HATÁSVIZSGÁLATI LAP				
Iktatószám:	45085-3/2014/JOGI	Dátum:	2014. szeptember. 10	
A hatásvizsgálat elkészítésére fordított idő:	1 munkanap	Kapcsolódó hatásvizsgálati lapok:	-	
Hatásvizsgálatba bevont személyek, szervezetek:	-	Vizsgált időtáv:	2015-2018.	

Előterjesztés címe:	Előterjesztés az egyes egészségügyi és egészségbiztosítási tárgyú törvények módosításáról	Előterjesztő:	ЕММІ
Intézkedés megnevezése:	A létfontosságú rendszerek és létesítmények azonosításáról, kijelöléséről és védelméről szóló 2012. évi CLXVI. törvény módosítása		
Előterjesztés szükségessége:	A gyógyszer-nagykereskedelmi tevékenység hazánk egészségügyi biztonsága, illetve a lakosság ellátása szempontjából kiemelten fontos, ezért az ellátás biztonságának szempontjából fontos azonosítani valamennyi olyan szereplőt, amelyek tevékenységének kiesése komoly fennakadásokkal jár.		
Utolsó módosítás dátuma:	-	Következő módosítás várható dátuma:	-
Előzmények:		-	

Végrehajtás feltétételei			
Az intézkedés alkalmazásához szükséges személyi, szervezeti, tárgyi és pénzügyi feltételek adottak?	igen	A végrehajtás feltétlei adottak, a tevékenység besorolása nem jár többletfeladattal.	

	I. VERSENYI	KÉPESSÉG
1. Miként járul hozzá az intézkedés az ország versenyképeségének javításához?		Nem változik érdemben



2. Az intézkedés hozzájárul a foglalkozatás növeléséhez?		nem	Hány fővel?		
3. Megtörtént-e az intézkedés adminisztratív terhekre gyakorolt hatásainak vizsgálata?		igen			
Piaci szereplők esetén					
	Növekednek	0 F	t	mértékben	
	☐ Csökkennek	0 F	0 Ft mértékben		
Közigaz	atási szereplők esetén Lakossági és egyéb nem piaci szereplők esetén		ereplők esetén		
	Növekednek		☐ Növe	ekednek	
	Csökkennek		☐ Csök	kennek	
II. TÁRSADALMI FELZÁRKÓZÁS					
	1. Érinte	tt csoportok			
	Csoport megnevezése	Csoport mérete (fő)	Előny -	- Hátrány	
1.	Gyógyszernagykereskedők	300	V		
2.	-	0			
3.	-	0	Ш	Ш	
2. Hatások összefoglalója					

# III. STABIL KÖLTSÉGVETÉS Költségvetési hatások A vizsgált időszakban Az aktuális évben További négy évben Az intézkedés költségvetési egyenlegrontó hatása O Ft O Ft O Ft O Ft



Az intézkedés költségvetési egyenlegjavító hatása	0 Ft	0 Ft	0 Ft
Az intézkedés egyenlegjavító hatásának figyelembevétele a költségvetésben	0 Ft	0 Ft	
Teljes hatás	0 Ft	0 Ft	0 Ft
Teljes hatás az elfogadott költségvetéshez képest	0 Ft	0 Ft	0 Ft

·	
IV. FENNTARTHATÓ FEJLŐDÉS	,
annak-e az intézkedésben foglaltaknak jelentősnek ítélt környezeti vagy ermészeti hatásai?	nem
Hatások összefoglalója	
V. EGYÉB HATÁSOK	
annak-e az intézkedésben foglaltaknak jelentősnek ítélt egészséghatásai?	igen
A gyógyszernagykereskedelmi tevékenység révén az egészségügyi	biztonság szintje emelkedik.
annak-e az intézkedésnek további hatásai?	nem

Jóváhagyta:	Dr. Beneda Attila	